Evidence, Handcuffs and Guilt
Abstract
Understanding the ways in which preconceived defendant stereotypes and juror bias play into perceptions of guilt has been an integral part of understanding the unconscious cognitive mind [American Psychological Association. (2011, October 2); Ma-Kellams et al, (2016)]. A study conducted at the outset of this year amongst university psychology students intended to find out how the effect of varying degrees of evidence of guilt, and the visual cue of handcuffs influenced perceptions of guilt amongst a suspect leading to an increased bias towards condemning a suspect. The results demonstrated that there was indeed a positive correlation the independent and dependent variables: that handcuffs increase perceptions of suspect guilt, as does the strength of evidence. These indications and outcomes suggest that defendant stereotypes can feed into juror bias, affecting the outcome of a criminal trial. Therefore, the implications of this study can be extended to influencing how a jury may be presented with a defendant in future, as well as ultimately revealing a small insight into the nature of how human stereotype affects mundane situations.
It is usually accepted as fact in the world of psychology that visual cues directly influence juror perceptions and defendant stereotypes [(Brown et al, (2018)]. Furthermore, studies of this nature have left little doubt as to the coup de grace strong evidence leaves on a suspect [Brown et al, (2018); Heath et al, (2004)]. In this report, the impact of presence or absence of handcuffs in varying degrees of evidence conditions are explored in depth, with the presupposition that handcuffs will in fact result in a significant juror bias and perception of suspect guilt. Whilst there are some reports that suggest bias should be always be taken into account in the court room [(Kleynhans et al, 2017)], this is usually focused on more significant issues such as racial prejudice; is a juries bias on the account of handcuffs significant enough to warrant questioning of judicial decisions? Coming to conclusions based on visual cues is an integral part of the psychoanalytic mind [Freundlieb et al, (2017); Royer et al, (2004); Leach et al, (2016)], which forms the crux of jury-based deliberation. In fact, drawing attention to this issue to a jury may further skew perception, bringing it from the unconscious mind into the conscious.
Directly influenced by these notions, recent research aims to break down the unconscious cognitive mind, and the role that stereotypes play in understanding the world around us, which are often beneficially allow us to gouge threat, expected response and process a situation [Shih et al, 2012]. Coming back into the microcosm of this particular experiment, a group of 60 groups of individuals are to be exposed to suspects with low, medium and high incriminating conditions and the disparity between innocence-guilt is directly contrasted between handcuff to non-handcuff (H/NH) groups on a suspect guilt scale of -100 to 100. This research report builds upon these pre-existing studies by focusing on a particular visual que for bias (handcuffs) and measuring suspect guilt across several evidence conditions simultaneously, a dual methodology significantly lacking from prior studies. It is essential to see how these specific visual cues can shift in different evidence conditions, because only then can a proper conclusion be drawn as to the effects of the visual cue across all grounds of proof in the justice system, and this experiment aims to do just that.
Results
The first rounds (strong, p=0.31) H/NH comparative results indicate what would have been an adherence to the hypothesis, however they were not statistically significant since the p value was >0.05. In the second round (ambiguous, p=0.01) and third round (weak, p=0.03) the hypothesis that criminals with visible handcuffs were subject to increased presuppositions of suspect guilt were significantly affirmed with p values <0.05. On another note, the secondary independent variable being tested; evidence strength, also showed significant results of effect on notions of defendant guilt, with a comparison of evidence at the greatest extremes towards both, strong to weak, separating H/NH groups to avoid confounding results with both p values = 0.01, well within significance boundaries, indicating that the stronger the evidence the more a jury is likely to condemn a defendant, and vice versa.
Discussion
As was expected strong evidence conditions and the presence of handcuffs both positively affected group bias and defendant stereotype, reinforcing previous studies on the unconscious bias amongst juries based on evidence condition and visual stereotype [Brown et al, (2018); Heath et al, (2004)]. As a result of this experiment the alternate hypothesis that there was a correlation between average suspect guilt ratings and the independent variables was affirmed. This is an important conclusion to draw because it ensures fairness in the judicial proves and mitigating these biases can ensure a fairer trial for those judged by groups [Robenolt et al, (2009); Robbennolt, (2010)]
On an even larger and more generic scale these results provide valuable insight into the unconscious processes and judgements of the human mind, expanding pre-existing bodies of human psychology. The majority of these findings were significant, though unfortunately one of the evidence conditions comparing handcuff effect on average guilt ratings was not significant, limiting the ability to rule out that results were biased and that it is possible to replicate them, likely a direct result of the fact that as intelligent psychology students who have a preconceived notion of what the results should have been (strong evidence, and wearing handcuffs), response to ques was indirectly affected, which is a shame considering the large sample size. Atop of this, the experiment was conducted in simulated environment of such a situation; not the real thing which is important a simulated scenario cannot replicate all of the controlled variables, and situational psychological effects of a true judicial scenario, only it’s predicted outcome.
This study benefitted greatly from prior research [Brown et al, (2018); Heath et al, (2004); Royer et al, (2004); Robbenolt, (2009); Robbenolt, (2010)]on the effects of suspect stereotypes and no doubt a study such as this will further expand this base. Studies would benefit from testing a greater number of visual ques (i.e. punky hair, piercings, etc) on unconscious bias and group judgement. In line with findings by Heath (2004)[tatoo centric] and Leach (2016)[niqab centric] visual cues seem to form a significant part of suspect guilt ratings and perception, and a study that was able to have multiple visual cues being tested simultaneously, or a study that explored how to mitigate these biases would have ground-breaking ramifications on how a court room would limit suspect stereotypes and judicial bias to ensure a fairer trial, ultimately facilitating an impartial justice system.
References
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